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Thesis: In upholding the constitutionality of capital punishment, the United States Supreme
Court has utilized a strict construction interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, which has led the opponents of capital punishment to abandon the Due Process
approach and look to the Eighth Amendment, for which the justices utilize a loose construction
interpretation.
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“Most people approve of capital punishment, but most people would not do the
hangman’s job.”1 Although capital punishment has been a constitutionally recognized practice
since America’s colonial history, there is still great controversy that surrounds the tradition.2
The Supreme Court of the United States (the Court), has often upheld the constitutionality of
capital punishment through its interpretation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.3
However, the methods of constitutional interpretation have varied throughout the court’s history,
thus altering the constitutionality of aspects of capital punishment.4 The methods of interpretation
utilized by the Court can broadly be categorized as strict and loose constructionist, and
encompass several specific views regarding the Constitution and its amendments.5 Interpretations
of constitutionality come in trends and depend on the particular Justices reviewing a case. For
example, in 1972 the Court ruled that capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, then
reinstated the practice in 1976.6 Therefore, in upholding the constitutionality of capital
punishment, the United States Supreme Court has utilized a strict construction interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which has led the opponents of capital
punishment to abandon the Due Process Approach and look to the Eighth Amendment, for which
the justices utilize a loose construction interpretation.
The famous case, Marbury v. Madison, heard by Chief Justice John Marshall’s Supreme
Court in 1803, established the principle of judicial review, which provided the Court the power
to declare an act of the United States government unconstitutional and therefore null and void.7
It was Marshall’s passionate belief that the federal judiciary must have the power of judicial
review. Delivering the opinion of his 19th century Court Chief Justice Marshall wrote,
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide
on the operation of each (Marbury v. Madison 1803, emphasis his).
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Marshall held that the Constitution was superior to any ordinary act of the legislature and
therefore must govern any case to which both apply. In his ruling, Marshall applied a strict
construction interpretation of the Constitution; he wanted to demonstrate that judicial review is a
“logical extension of the Court’s exercise of judicial power, that is, the power to decide cases” as
exemplified in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution (Ducat 5. See Appendix B).
Regarding constitutional interpretation, authors Sotirios Barber and James E. Fleming
hold, “Interpreting the American Constitution is a cognitive activity that takes place in a specific
kind of context and proceeds from specific assumptions. The context is one of disagreement
about whether an act of government is either permitted or required by some provision or
associated principle of the Constitution. The assumptions at work in this context are; (1) that the
Constitution, faithfully followed, would limit what the government may do; (2) that those limits
can be known with reasonable confidence; (3) that reasonable persons would regard those limits
in general as serving a paramount good” (Barber 13). Paramount good may be understood either
from the perspective of the Founding Fathers, whose aim was the protection of natural rights, or
more progressive thinkers who viewed paramount good as social progress. The Constitution not
only limits what government may do, but also permits the government certain actions. Whether a
strict or loose interpretation is applied, the ultimate aim of constitutional interpretation is to make
sense of what the Constitution says—seeing for ourselves why anyone would voluntarily adopt
the Constitution as supreme law.8
Strict construction interpretation is a broad term for the traditional approach to
constitutional interpretation. It encompasses a more literal or narrow reading of constitutional
provisions, which may either permit or limit government actions. A strict construction
interpretation of the Constitution may protect state rights when those rights are at risk of being
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usurped by the federal government (McClellan). However, words can have many different
meanings which could change the entire context of a section or even the whole document itself.
Textualism, Originalism, and Structuralism are three common forms of strict construction.9
Textualism finds constitutional meaning by consulting the plain words of the
constitutional document. A famous example of the textualist approach to constitutional
interpretation is Justice Hugo Black’s view of the Ninth Amendment applied to Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965), where he held that that the only constitutional rights are those enumerated in
the text.10 In the same manner, Originalism, also referred to as “Original Meaning,” looks to the
original public meaning of the words of the constitutional document, what they meant in 1791.
“Original Intent” is another aspect of Originalism, but is not part of the focus of this essay.11
Lastly, Structuralism looks to the overall constitutional arrangement of offices, powers, and
relationships—“the meaning of the Constitution as a whole” (Barber 117). The leading structural
principles include federalism, separation of powers, and democracy.12
In contrast to strict construction, loose construction and it specific approaches hold a very
different view of constitutional interpretation. Loose construction allows the meaning of the text
of the Constitution to change over time. Former Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan
wrote, “The function of the Supreme Court justice is to interpret the Constitution in such a way
as to resolve the predominant social, economic, philosophical, and political questions of the daywhich are often issues on which contemporary society is most deeply divided” (Stolyarov II).
Loose construction uses the Necessary and Proper Clause and the General Welfare Clause of the
Constitution in its determination of constitutionality. The Constitution is interpreted as
authorizing congressional laws for any activity or purpose not explicitly forbidden to the federal
government (Purvis).13
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Common classifications of loose construction are the Philosophic Approach,14
Doctrinalism, and Consensualism. These approaches all allow the meaning of constitutional
provisions to change according to contemporary standards. The Philosophic Approach
represents a fusion of constitutional and moral philosophy, how we ought to interpret the words
of the Constitution to approximate their true meaning in a contemporary context.15 Accordingly,
constitutional law has involved controversial philosophic choices throughout American history
(Barber 164). Doctrinalism, however, looks to constitutional provisions through layers of
interpretations in previous cases rather than directly. These past interpretations purport to
articulate constitutional principles in the form of rule or precedents that bind future courts
(Barber 135).16 It is difficult in constitutional law to decide why an old case should be a
precedent for future cases.17 However, it must be recognized that American constitutional
practice does include a limited policy of stare decisis, 18 which makes old cases important,
though not totally conclusive in judicial determinations of constitutional meaning. This can
involve evolving meanings through changes from case to case. Consensualism consults a current
social consensus on what the words of the Constitution mean, which can change and evolve over
time. 19
The methods of constitutional interpretation are essential to understand capital
punishment and why its constitutionality has been upheld by the Court. Capital punishment has
been an established practice in the United States since the country’s colonial history, adopted
from English custom. The “bloody” codes of England’s criminal code, which listed hundreds of
capital crimes, were modified to suit local colonial needs (Oshinsky 5). For example, in
Massachusetts, where religion played a significant role in settlement, capital offenses included
crimes such as blasphemy, witchcraft, and adultery.20 The death penalty’s legitimacy rested on
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three well defined principles: deterrence, penitence, and retribution (Oshinsky 5). Capital
punishment was popular during colonial times because it, “fulfilled the moral expectations of
colonial Americans most of the time, and that was enough to make it the standard penalty for all
serious crimes. Hardly anyone suggested that it be used more sparingly, much less that it be
abandoned.”21 The death penalty was seen as essential to preserving the moral and social order
throughout the colonies (Oshinsky). In post-revolutionary America the power to impose the
death penalty was left to the individual states.22
The Founding Fathers had made it explicitly clear that executions excluding torture did
not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment”
(Oshinsky 7). The Fifth Amendment, adopted on the same day as the Eighth, prescribes that a
person cannot “be twice put in jeopardy of life” for the same offenses, nor “be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of the law.”23 This presents the clear implication that a
person can be executed if due process is provided. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment has
been used by the Court as a legal mechanism in its determination of the constitutionality of state
capital punishment. The Fourteenth Amendment permits capital punishment and allows the
federal government to regulate and review execution laws. The federal government may
intervene when there is an absence of due process. The Incorporation Doctrine applies the Eighth
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment which allows the federal
government to intervene in capital punishment if there is due process but the prescribed
execution method is cruel and unusual; this is not disputed.24
The Court applied the Due Process Approach when it reviewed Furman v. Georgia in
1972 and Gregg v. Georgia in 1976. In Furman the majority held that the imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
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violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Georgia capital punishment laws violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because they allowed death to be imposed in an
“arbitrary” and “capricious” manner. The court was profoundly divided on this issue presented in
the case, thus the opinion was per curiam.25 Chief Justice Blackmun wrote, “Although the Eighth
Amendment literally reads as prohibiting only those punishments that are both ‘cruel’ and
‘unusual,’ history compels the conclusion that the Constitution prohibits all punishments of
extreme and barbarous cruelty, regardless of how frequently or infrequently imposed” (Furman).
Since the Court determined that Georgia’s capital punishment laws had been unjustly applied,
the government had the right to intervene through the Fourteenth Amendment power to review
state procedure.
However, in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court upheld Georgia’s new capitalsentencing procedures, concluding that they had sufficiently reduced the problem of arbitrary
and capricious imposition of death associated with earlier statutes. The new laws provided for
bifurcated proceedings, one to determine guilt and one to determine whether to execute. Justice
Stewart, delivering the opinion of the court, wrote: “We now hold that the punishment of death
does not invariably violate the Constitution” (Gregg). The constitutionality of the sentence of
death itself was not at issue, and the criterion used to evaluate the mode of execution was its
similarity to “torture” and other “barbarous” methods.26 The majority held that “evolving
standards of decency” require focus not on the essence of the death penalty itself but primarily
upon the procedures employed by the State to single out persons to suffer the penalty of death.27
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process approach was once more applicable because the Court
again focused on the procedural aspects of capital punishment.28
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McClesky v. Kempp, heard in1987, illustrates one of the last major attempts by opponents
of capital punishment to restrict the death penalty through the Due Process Approach. The Court
reviewed a challenge to death penalty laws based on a study that showed murderers of white
victims were far more likely to be sentenced to death than murderers of black victims.29
McClesky argued that the Baldus study demonstrates that the Georgia capital sentencing system
violates the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell wrote, “This case presents the question whether a
complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into capital
sentencing determinations proves that petitioner McClesky’s capital sentence is unconstitutional
under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” The majority wrote, “In light of our precedents
under the Eighth Amendment, McClesky cannot argue successfully that his sentence is
“disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense” (McClesky).
McClesky did not deny that he committed a murder in the course of a planned robbery, a
crime for which this Court has determined that the death penalty constitutionally may be
imposed.30 His disproportionality claim “is of a different sort”31 because McClesky argued that
the sentence in his case is disproportionate to the sentences in other murder cases. Nevertheless,
the Court held that because McClesky’s sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing
procedures that focus discretion “on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant,” they may lawfully may presume that McClesky’s
death sentence was not “wantonly and freakishly” imposed (McClesky). Accordingly, the
sentence is not disproportionate within any recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment.
Similarly, the Court stated that there was no evidence that the Georgia Legislature enacted the
capital punishment statute to further a racially discriminatory purpose, and McClesky failed to
demonstrate that “the legislature maintains the capital punishment statute because of the racially
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disproportionate impact suggested by the Baldus study” (McCleksy). Therefore, McClesky’s due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were not violated. Although there have been
more recent cases that have partly used the Due Process Approach, their scope has been very
narrow and apply only in a small number of death penalty cases.32 As it stands, McClesky has
been the last major attempt at restricting capital punishment through the Due Process Clause.
Post-McClesky, death penalty opponents began to rely on the Court’s more loose
construction interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in an attempt to restrict capital punishment.
In 2002 the Court reviewed Atkins v. Virginia, considering whether capital punishment is
unconstitutional when applied to the mentally retarded, and if punishment is excessive judged by
the standards that currently prevail.33 Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in light of
society’s developing standards, the Court concluded that such punishment is excessive and that
the Constitution “places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life” of a
mentally retarded offender (Atkins). The majority also held, “The basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. . . The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”
(Atkins).34 Using a more loose construction approach the majority relied on interpreting the
Eighth Amendment according to contemporary standards of what constitutes “cruel and unusual”
punishment.
The Atkins dissent, consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
held to a more strict construction interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. The justices embraced
the opinion that the question presented by this case is whether a national consensus deprives
Virginia of the constitutional power to impose the death penalty on capital murder defendants
like the petitioner. Writing separately, Chief Justice Rehnquist called attention to the “defects” in
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the Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws, the views of professional and religious
organizations, and opinion polls in reaching its conclusion (Atkins).35 According to Rehnquist,
making determinations about whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual” under the evolving
standards of decency embraced by the Eighth Amendment, the Court has emphasized that
legislation is the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values” (Atkins).
In effect, Rehnquist does recognize that there are evolving standards of decency and these allow
for the meaning of what is cruel and unusual to change over time. However, unlike the majority,
Rehnquist holds that it is the province of the legislator—federal and state—to determine the
meaning.36 Further, the work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations—ought
to be the sole indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of
decency for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.37
Capital punishment was further restricted in 2005 when the Court reviewed the case
Roper v. Simmons. Reconsidering the decision made in Stanford v. Kentucky (1989),38 the Court
determined that the death penalty could not be applied to persons under the age of 18 at the time
they committed their crime. Utilizing a more loose construction interpretation once more the
majority argued that the Eighth Amendment’s provision against “cruel and unusual punishment”
is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporation Doctrine. Relying on
the Court’s decision in Atkins, the majority further held that the Eighth Amendment guarantees
individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. The right flows from the basic
“precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense” (Roper). Their opinion stated, “A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the
death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the Eighth
Amendment” (Roper).39 The Court’s determination that the death penalty is disproportionate
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punishment for offenders under 18 “finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States
is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty” (Roper). Though the majority utilized foreign law in their decision, this utilization was
not required, loose construction interpretation allows the court to use foreign law. It was the
Court’s belief that this reality does not become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth
Amendment remains the responsibility of the Court.
Dissenting Justice O’Connor argued that, “The Court’s decision today establishes a
categorical rule forbidding the execution of any offender for any crime committed before his 18th
birthday, no matter how deliberate, wanton, or cruel the offense. Neither the objective evidence
of contemporary societal values, nor the Court’s moral proportionality analysis, nor the two in
tandem suffice to justify this ruling” (Roper). Although the Court found support for its decision
in the fact that a majority of the States now disallow capital punishment of 17-year-old offenders,
it refrained from asserting that its holding is compelled by a genuine “national consensus”
(Roper).40 O’Connor did agree with much of the Court’s description of the general principles that
guide Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The Amendment bars not only punishments that are
inherently “barbaric,” but also those that are “excessive” in relation to the crime committed.”41
However, O’Connor did not agree that capital punishment is a disproportionate penalty for
juvenile offenders.42
Likewise, Justice Scalia along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas argued
for a more strict construction interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Scalia vehemently wrote,
“What a mockery today’s opinion makes of Hamilton’s expectation, announcing the Court’s
conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years — not, mind
you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has changed.

Paone 13
The Court reaches this implausible result by purporting to advert, not to the original meaning of
the Eighth Amendment, but to ‘the evolving standards of decency’ of our national society”
(Roper, emphasis his).43 The majority claimed an impossible assertion when it argued for a
“national consensus” that affects the modern “standards of decency” and in effect the Court
“throws overboard a proposition well established in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence”
(Roper). Further, it was Scalia’s opinion that judges are “ill equipped” to make legislative
judgments as the majority attempted in this cases (Roper).44
More recently, in Baze v. Rees (2008) the Court ruled that Kentucky’s lethal injection
procedure is consistent with the Eighth Amendment and does not violate the ban against “cruel
and unusual” punishment. The Court affirmed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s ruling that a
method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only when it “creates a substantial risk of
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture or lingering death” (Baze). It was held that
lethal injection does not create such a risk.45 Continuing, the Court wrote, “Kentucky’s decision
to adhere to its protocol despite asserted risks, while adopting safeguards to protect against them,
cannot be viewed as probative of the wanton infliction of pain under the Eighth Amendment”
(Baze).46 Kentucky’s lethal injection procedure was upheld because it provides sufficient
safeguards that makes it one of the most humane forms of capital punishment, and therefore
constitutional.
Dissenting Justice Ginsburg joined by Justice Souter, disputed the constitutionality of
Kentucky’s protocol. They stated, “Kentucky’s protocol lacks basic safeguards used by other
States to confirm that an inmate is unconscious before injection of the second and third drugs. I
would vacate and remand with instructions to consider whether Kentucky's omission of those
safe-guards poses an untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain”
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(Baze).47 Currently, no clear standard for determining the constitutionality of a method of
execution emerges from prior decisions. This is so because the Eighth Amendment “must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society” (Atkins). Whatever little light prior method-of-execution cases might shed is “thus
dimmed by the passage of time” (Baze).48
There is a general consensus in the Court that capital punishment in and of itself is not
cruel and unusual, and its opponents have been unable to use the Eighth Amendment to overturn
capital punishment as such. Loose construction interpretation of the Eighth Amendment has been
more successful in designating the execution of certain groups as cruel and unusual because of
the evolving standards of decency doctrine. A more strict construction approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment restrains due process and any changes may be accommodated by the
states so that they may retain capital punishment.49 Therefore, in upholding the constitutionality
of capital punishment, the United States Supreme Court has utilized a strict construction
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which has led the opponents
of capital punishment to abandon the Due Process Approach and look to the Eighth Amendment,
for which the justices utilize a loose construction interpretation.
Endnotes

1

Quote from George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier (Quotes on Capital Punishment,

http://www.notable-quotes.com/c/capital_punishment_quotes.html).
2

Capital punishment is defined as execution (death) for a criminal offense. Offenses are

called “capital” since the defendant could lose his/her head (Latin for caput). The means of
capital punishment used in the United States include lethal injection, electrocution, gas chamber,
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hanging, and firing squad. All capital offenses require automatic appeals, which means that
approximately 2,500 men and women are presently on “death row” awaiting their appeals or
death. Crimes punishable by death vary from state to state. A charge of a capital offense usually
means no bail will be allowed (Ducat, Craig R). See Appendices J and K for capital punishments
and methods of execution by state.
3

Constitutional Interpretation: how a particular court, in this case Supreme Court,

determines whether an action of the legislature, executive or judiciary contravenes the
Constitution. In his article Constitutional Interpretation: Powers of government, Craig R. Ducat
mentions that the several modes of judicial review must “interconnect” three elements: the
justification for the review of government power in question, the standard of constitutionality to
be applied to the courts, and the method by which judges support the conclusion that a given
governmental action does or does not violate the Constitution (Ducat 76). The power of
constitutional interpretation is also referred to as judicial review, which was established in 1803
by the famous case of Marbury v. Madison. See Appendix B for Article III of the United States
Constitution. See Appendices D and E for the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
4

The United Supreme Court interprets the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution when determining the constitutionality of the capital punishment during a particular
case. The justices determine whether or not the instance of capital punishment has violated the
Amendment’s provision against cruel and unusual punishment and evolving standards of
decency. Cruel and unusual punishment is defined as, “governmental penalties against convicted
criminal defendants which are barbaric, involve torture and/or shock the public morality”
(Law.com Dictionary). See Appendix D for the Eighth Amendment.
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5

Strict Construction: Broad term for the traditional approach to constitutional

interpretation. Constructional provisions are read literally, either permitting or restricting
government actions (Ducat). Loose Construction: Based on the Necessary and Proper Clause and
General Welfare Clause. It relies on broad interpretation of the Constitution and the powers of
Congress. Sometimes loose constructionists debate with strict construction over what the
Founders intended (Pervis).
6

These dates refer to two cases, Furman v. Georgia (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia (1976),

which will be further explored in this paper. In these cases the Eighth Amendment was applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Incorporation Doctrine, which will be explained
further in the course of this essay. See Appendices D and E for the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Appendices Y-AA for Information about the death penalty prior to 1972.
7

The doctrine of judicial review was not created by Chief Justice John Marshall, the

doctrine had its origins in early 17th century England. The case merely solidified the doctrine as a
power of the Court when it held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 violated Article III of the United
States Constitution. See Appendix B for Article III and Appendix F for Section 13 of Judiciary
Act of 1789.
8

The Federalist tries to answer this question for the founding generations and subsequent

generations, and the soundness of that answer has nothing to do with the personalities advancing
it. Federalist 1 presents the Constitution as a means to “the preservation of the Union and then
enhancement of the nation’s liberty…dignity… and happiness” (Barber 36). Therefore, The
Federalist embraces a positive constitutionalism. Regarding judicial power, in Federalist 78
Publius famously argues that judicial review is not undemocratic because it implies
constitutional supremacy rather than judicial supremacy. Constitutional supremacy as the

Paone 17
“supremacy of the higher law of ‘We the People’ embodied in the Constitution over the ordinary
law of agents of the people represented in legislation” (Barber 55). Publius saw the federal
judiciary as, “one of the instruments for making the public sensible of its true interests” (Barber
55).
9

These forms are discussed by Sotirios Barber and James E. Fleming in their book,

Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions. The authors believe that the “philosophic
approach” is the best or most defensible approach to Constitutional Interpretation. This approach
will be discussed in a later portion of the essay.
10

The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain

rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” In laymen’s
terms, the rights of Americans include rights in addition to those enumerated. However, Black’s
texualist point of view holds that the only constitutional rights are those enumerated in the text.
He believes that is undemocratic for unelected judges to invent rights against majoritarian
government beyond those rights specified in the text. Unwritten constitutional rights, like the
right to privacy, are merely inventions of judges. The authors’ believe that Black’s claim to be
governed by plain words turns out to be a way to escape responsibility for controversial choices
(Barber 70).
11

Original Intentions of the Framers of the Constitution can be either concrete or abstract.

“Concrete” originalism holds that the framers’ intended their conceptions of justice even if (1)
that conceptions was seen as unjust at the time, or if (2) it should prove unjust later, and if (3)
intending injustice is itself unjust (Barber 84). While “abstract” originalism illustrates that the
words and phrases of the constitutional document express a relatively clear set of intentions or
meanings, if by meanings the Framers meant general concepts and ideas and if by intentions they
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meant abstract intentions. Barber and Fleming assert that because constitutional provisions like
due process are expressed as general concepts, the constitutional text itself is evidence that the
framers’ intentions were abstract. Thus, the Constitution does not define its terms or give
examples of their proper applications (Barber 83). Robert Bork is a supporter of intentionalism
for judges. Bork affirms that intentionalism would be mandatory for judges even if the Framers
had not intended intentionalism for judges (Barber 81).
12

For example, according to John Hart Ely, a best-known structuralist, a woman does not

have a constitutional right to an abortion because the Constitution’s “open-ended” provisions
(“due process,” “equal protection” and the Ninth Amendment) should include only those
“unremunerated” rights essential to representative democracy, which he argues is the
Constitution’s leading structural value (Barber 118). Similarly, McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)
represents differences in opinions about the nature of American federalism (national federalism
versus states’ rights federalism) that persist today and reflect fundamental disagreements on the
“basic normative” properties of the Constitution (Barber118). Barber and Fleming write that the
question is not what the Constitution means a whole; it is what we ought to say it means.
13

Marshall and other Federalists favored this mode of constitutional interpretation.

Loose construction allows the government to go beyond Article I Section 8 restrictions. Marshall
believed that the government’s actions should be aimed at exercising its Article I powers. See
Appendix A for Article I Section 8 of the Constitution.
14

The approach favored by Sotirios Barber and James E. Fleming, authors of

Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Question. They favor the broader “philosophic
approach” to “moral reading” because they believe that fidelity to the Constitution requires, “a
reliance on the social sciences” as well as the “fusion of constitutional law and moral theory”
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(from Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1997, 149).
15

Barber and Fleming propose that good-faith constitutional interpretation requires a

willingness to change our minds about the major and minor premises of past constitutional
interpretations. There is a need to strive for (1) morally and/or scientifically sound
understandings of constitutional provisions that appear in the major premises of legal syllogisms,
and (2) true or sound accounts of the world that appear in minor premises. Interpretation requires
that judges and other interpreters make up their own minds about constitutional meaning in a
“spirit of self-critical striving to realize our constitutional commitments and to interpret the
Constitution to make it the best it can be” (Barber xiii). For example, the change from Plessy to
Brown, as well as other important changes in constitutional interpretation, illustrates the
philosophic approach. The goal of the philosophic approach is truth or best understanding of
constitutional commitments as distinguished from opinion. Also, the approach embraces other
interpretation approaches discussed by the authors.
16

An example of such precedent is the “separate but equal” doctrine of the Equal

Protection Clause, created in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which was later overturned by Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954.
17

This is so according to Barber and Fleming because constitutional law is an area where

it is generally agreed that courts can err about constitutional meaning and later courts may
legitimately cancel the precedential value of old cases by overruling them. Precedents
characteristically come in lines of decisions or series, and judges who would follow precedent
typically ask what a whole series says about the law (Barber 136). This was the case when the
Court considered Brown v. Board of Education (1954), in which stare decisis pointed to Plessy

Paone 20
and Sweatt v. Painter (1950), which further elaborated the doctrine of “separate but equal.”
Brown ultimately overruled Plessy and Sweatt. Stare decisis cannot eliminate controversial
choices in hard cases; doctrinalism cannot avoid the burdens and responsibilities of philosophic
reflection and choice in such cases (Barber 140).
18

19

Stare decisis is a legal policy that means letting the precedent stand as decided.
Barber and Fleming break down the consensualist view using abortion as an example,

which is another very controversial topic like capital punishment. The Major Premise breaks
down as; Liberty (as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment) includes
only what a current social consensus says it includes. The Minor Premise would then be; a
current social consensus supports no more than a liberty to decide to have an abortion in cases of
rape, incest, or serious fetal deformity. The conclusion would therefore be; liberty (at present)
includes a liberty to have an abortion only in those three circumstances.
20

Also, in Virginia, where slavery prevailed over religion, property crimes and a separate

code for slaves was emphasized as death penalty crimes. In Pennsylvania however, Quaker
sentiment strongly opposed capital punishment and the legislature made murder alone a capital
crime.
21

Quote from historian Louis Masur (Quoted Oshinsky 5).

22

During the 1800s executions declined along with the public spectacle that once

surrounded them. By the Civil War many states including Michigan, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin had abolished the death penalty, while others had reduced the number of capital
crimes. Any further reform or outright abolitions would be annihilated by the Civil War and the
aftermath of Reconstruction, the “lawlessness of Reconstruction further convinced Americans of
all regions of the need for extreme punishment to restore social order” (Oshinsky 8). However,
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the Progressive Era of the early 1900s brought with it the abolition of the death penalty in many
state, but the Great Depression of the 1930s, with its “fear of crime and disorder” would raise the
number or executions to new levels (Oshinsky 8). Unlike the North, the South seemed
“historically averse to national concerns” (Oshinsky9). Oshinsky writes, “But what truly defined
the South, and isolated it from the national mainstream, was the legacy of slavery” (Oshinsky 910). The South’s reliance on capital punishment had been geared toward “racial control” and a
continuation of its “race-based vigilante tradition” (Oshinsky10).
23

See Appendices C and D for the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. See Appendix BB for

some of the Founders’ thoughts on capital punishment.
24

It is now widely held that most of the Bill of Rights is incorporated so as to apply to the

states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Incorporation
Doctrine was created after the Fourteenth Amendment, and at that time the Bill of Rights was
held initially to apply only to the federal government (Barron v. Baltimore 1833). See Appendix
L for a list of federal capital offenses.
25

Latin for “by the court,” each justice wrote a separate opinion; none were persuaded to

join with another. Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall were ready to strike down capital
punishment on Eighth Amendment grounds. Nixon appointees Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist were on the opposite end, while Stewart and White were somewhere in the middle.
Thurgood Marshall wrote, “I cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American people
would ever knowingly support purposeless vengeance” (Oshinsky 50). Brennan’s opinion
restated his view that a punishment is “cruel and unusual if it does not comport with human
dignity and inflicts pointless suffering on the individual” (Oshinsky 51).
26

In his opinion Justice Stewart referred to Wilkerson v. Utah (1879), in which the
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justices ruled, “[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line
of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment . . .” Stewart continued on to state that
the Court has not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to “barbarous”
methods that were generally outlawed in the 18th century. Instead, the Amendment has been
interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner. Thus the Clause forbidding “cruel and unusual
punishments is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice” (Furman).
27

In his dissent Justice Brennan wrote, “The fatal constitutional infirmity in the

punishment of death is that it treats members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be
toyed with and discarded. [It is] thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause
[forbidding cruel and unusual punishment] that even the vilest criminal remains a human being
possessed of common human dignity. As such it is a penalty that subjects the individual to a fate
forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the [Clause]. I therefore would
hold, on that ground alone, that death is today a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Clause. Justice of this kind is obviously no less shocking than the crime itself, and the new
‘official’ murder, far from offering redress for the offense committed against society, adds
instead a second defilement to the first” (Gregg v. Georgia). Justice Marshall held loyal to the
view he formed in Furman v. Georgia that the death penalty is a “cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” In Furman Marshall concluded that the
death penalty is constitutionally invalid for two reasons, “First, the death penalty is
excessive. And second, the American people, fully informed as to the purposes of the death
penalty and its liabilities, would in my view reject it as morally unacceptable” (Gregg v.
Georgia).
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28

The problem with the Due Process Approach is that it invites the government to change

procedure in order to circumvent restrictions. The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
provision is more restrictive. In Gregg the Court determined that new death penalty procedures
were not cruel and unusual, hence the Eighth Amendment was also applicable to the case.
29

McClesky was challenging the Baldus study, two sophisticated statistical studies that

examined over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970’s. The raw numbers
collected by Professor Baldus indicated that defendants charged with killing white persons
received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks
received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases. The raw numbers also indicated a reverse
racial disparity according to the race of the defendant: 4% of the black defendants received the
death penalty, as opposed to 7% of the white defendants. It was indicated that black defendants,
such as McClesky, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death
penalty. McClesky claimed that the Baldus study demonstrated that he was discriminated against
because of his race and because of the race of his victim. In its broadest form, McClesky’s claim
of discrimination extends to every actor in the Georgia capital sentencing process, from the
prosecutor who sought the death penalty and the jury that imposed the sentence, to the State
itself that enacted the capital punishment statute and allows it to remain in effect despite its
allegedly discriminatory application (McClesky v. Kempp 1978). See Appendix M for
demographic characteristics of prisoners executed and Appendix P for the number persons
executed by race/method.
30

Gregg v. Georgia (1976)

31

Pulley v. Harris, supra, at 43.

32

The most recent case is Panetti v. Quarterman (2007). In the case the Court ruled on
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whether the Eighth Amendment permits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness
deprives him of “the mental capacity to understand that [he] is being executed as a punishment
for a crime.” Using the Due Process Approach, Panetti illustrates a minor attempt at extending
Due Process by trying to stretch beyond the limits of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996. The rest of the case was an Eighth Amendment case that referred to Ford v.
Wainwright (1986), which prohibits the execution of the mentally ill. See Appendix G: More
Post 1972 Supreme Court Capital Punishment Rulings.
33

The Eighth Amendment succinctly prohibits “[e]xcessive” sanctions. It provides:

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted” (Atkins v. Virginia). See Appendix V for Death Penalty Public
Opinion Polls.
34

The majority utilized a loose construction interpretation for their holdings. They further

stated, “Having pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable objective’ evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures. The practice (of
executing mentally retarded offenders), therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say
that a national consensus has developed against it... As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986), with regard to insanity, “we leave to the State[s] the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences”
(Atkins). Both “evolving standards of decency” and loose construction constitutional
interpretation allow for the definition of what is cruel and unusual to change over time. This is
why both principles fit so closely together. See Appendix R for Information about Justices Who
Authored Important Majority Opinions.
35

Rehnquist wrote, “The Court’s suggestion that these sources are relevant to the
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constitutional question finds little support in our precedents and, in my view, is antithetical to
considerations of federalism, which instruct that any permanent prohibition upon all units of
democratic government must [be apparent] in the operative acts (laws and the application of
laws) that the people have approved” (Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 1989). See
Appendix S for Information about Justices Who Authored Major Dissenting Opinions.
36

The liberal, moderate, and conservative members of the Court, such as Kennedy and

Rehnquist, believe in evolving standards of decency. However, the liberal members hold that it is
the responsibility of the Court to decide how the standards affect the definition of cruel and
unusual, while the conservatives hold that it is the duty of the legislator.
37

Chief Justice Rehnquist continued, “More importantly, however, they can be reconciled

with the undeniable precepts that the democratic branches of government and individual
sentencing juries are, by design, better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to the
complex societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of publicly acceptable
criminal punishments” (Atkins). The ruling contained aspects of both strict and loose
construction interpretation of capital punishment. Aspects of strict construction allows for
democratic determination of due process while loose allows the standards of evolving decency to
change over time—what people think is cruel and unusual.
38

In Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) the Court determined whether it is permissible under

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution to execute a juvenile offender who
was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime. A divided Court
rejected the proposition that the Constitution bars capital punishment for juvenile offenders in
this age group. See Appendix V for Death Penalty Public Opinion Polls.
39

Juveniles were not to be classified as “the worst sort of offender” because according to
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the majority, “Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that
juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders: [a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in
adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous
and ill-considered actions and decisions. The second area of difference is that juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.
The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed. These differences render
suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders. The susceptibility of
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means. Their irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult” (Roper).
40

O’Connor wrote, “Indeed, the evidence before us fails to demonstrate conclusively that

any such consensus has emerged in the brief period since we upheld the constitutionality of this
practice in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). But the Court has adduced no evidence
impeaching the seemingly reasonable conclusion reached by many state legislatures: that at least
some 17-year-old murderers are sufficiently mature to deserve the death penalty in an
appropriate case. Nor has it been shown that capital sentencing juries are incapable of accurately
assessing a youthful defendant’s maturity or of giving due weight to the mitigating
characteristics associated with youth” (Roper). See Appendix O for statistics on offenders’ age at
time of arrest for their capital offense.
41

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), plurality opinion

42

O’Connor stated, “The proportionality issues raised by the Court clearly implicate

Eighth Amendment concerns. But these concerns may properly be addressed not by means of an

Paone 27
arbitrary, categorical age-based rule, but rather through individualized sentencing in which juries
are required to give appropriate mitigating weight to the defendant’s immaturity, his
susceptibility to outside pressures, his cognizance of the consequences of his actions, and so
forth. In that way the constitutional response can be tailored to the specific problem it is meant to
remedy” (Roper).
43

Scalia continued, “Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth

Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I
dissent” (Roper). Scalia is a “faint-hearted” originalist when it comes to cruel and unusual
punishment. It is Scalia’s belief that originalism is the “lesser evil” to nonorginalist constitutional
interpretation because it is more compatible with the nature and purpose of the Constitution
(from his article, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil”). See Appendix U for Global Death Penalty Use
in 2009.
44

Scalia wrote, “None of our cases dealing with an alleged constitutional limitation upon

the death penalty has counted, as States supporting a consensus in favor of that limitation, States
that have eliminated the death penalty entirely. What might be relevant, perhaps, is how many of
those States permit 16- and 17-year-old offenders to be treated as adults with respect to
noncapital offenses. To support its opinion that States should be prohibited from imposing the
death penalty on anyone who committed murder before age 18, the Court looks to scientific and
sociological studies, picking and choosing those that support its position. It never explains why
those particular studies are methodologically sound; none was ever entered into evidence or
tested in an adversarial proceeding” (Roper). The “proposition” Scalia refers to is the idea that in
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual the Court must look to the “evolving
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standards of decency,” not a “national consensus.” This is so due to the fact that founding era
capital punishment methods are not proposed as death penalty methods today. In part Scalia
accepts the idea of evolving standards of decency. See Appendix T for Number of Executions by
State since 1976.
45

In their argument the majority wrote, “The asserted problems related to the IV lines do

not establish a sufficiently substantial risk of harm to meet the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment. Kentucky has put in place several important safeguards to ensure that an adequate
dose of sodium thiopental is delivered to the condemned prisoner. Nor does Kentucky’s failure
to adopt petitioners’ proposed alternatives demonstrate that the Commonwealth's execution
procedure is cruel and unusual. Kentucky has adopted a method of execution believed to be the
most humane available, one it shares with 35 other States” (Baze).
46 “

Our society has nonetheless steadily moved to more humane methods of carrying out

capital punishment. The firing squad, hanging, the electric chair, and the gas chamber have each
in turn given way to more humane methods, culminating in today's consensus on lethal injection”
(Baze). See Appendix K for Methods of Execution by State.
47

The dissent’s argument rested upon the fact that the Court has considered the

constitutionality of a specific method of execution on only three prior occasions. Those cases,
and other decisions cited by the parties and amici, provide little guidance on the standard that
should govern petitioner’s challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol. In Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), the Court held that death by firing squad did not rank among the
“cruel and unusual punishments” banned by the Eighth Amendment. In so ruling, the Court did
not endeavor “to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides
that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.” Next, in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
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(1890), death by electrocution was the assailed method of execution. The Court reiterated that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits “torture” and “lingering death.” The word “cruel,” the Court
further observed, “implies . . . something inhuman . . . something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.” Those statements, however, were made en passant. Kemmler's actual
holding was that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the States, a proposition the Court
since repudiated, see, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Finally, in Louisiana ex
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the Court rejected Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to a re-electrocution following an earlier attempt that failed to cause
death (Baze). See Appendix CC for Reports on the Cruelty of Certain Execution Methods.
48

Closing Ginsburg wrote, “I agree with petitioners and the plurality that the degree of

risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of alternatives must be considered. I part ways with the
plurality, however, to the extent its “substantial risk” test sets a fixed threshold for the first
factor. The three factors are interrelated; a strong showing on one reduces the importance of the
others. Proof of “a slightly or marginally safer alternative” is, as the plurality notes, insufficient.
But if readily available measures can materially increase the likelihood that the protocol will
cause no pain, a State fails to adhere to contemporary standards of decency if it declines to
employ those measures (Baze).
49

The Fourteenth Amendment prescribes established due process procedure, and when

utilized to consider the constitutionality of capital punishment it looks more to what the
government is doing. The Eighth Amendment on the other hand looks at what the criminal is—
mentally retarded or a juvenile, for example. It is easier to attack capital punishment through the
Eighth Amendment because once it has been determined that a certain category of people are not
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subject to capital punishment, the states cannot change the rule. See Appendix W for a list of
Pro-Death Penalty Organizations and Appendix X for a list of Anti-Death Penalty Organizations.
See Appendix DD for a Pro-Death Penalty Article.
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Appendix A
Article I Section 8 of the United States Constitution
Article I Section 8:
Section. 8.
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights
and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United
States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer
Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
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To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become
the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Source: The United States Constitution.
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html

Appendix B
Article III of the United States Constitution
Article IIISection 1- The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2-The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;-- between a State and Citizens of
another State,--between Citizens of different States,--between Citizens of the same State
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claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

Source: The United States Constitution.
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html

Appendix C
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Fifth Amendment:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

Source: The United States Constitution, The Bill of Rights
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Appendix D
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
Eighth Amendment:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
[Ratified 1791]

Source: The United States Constitution, The Bill of Rights
Appendix E
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Sec. 1
Fourteenth Amendment- Section 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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Source: The United States Constitution.
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-27.html
Appendix F
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
The Supreme Court shall have the exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of civil nature,
where a state is a party, except between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which
latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction… and shall have the authority to
issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts
appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.

Source: Ducat, Craig R. Constitutional Interpretation: Powers of government. Cengage Learning,
2008. 9th ed.
Appendix G
More Post 1972 Supreme Court Capital Punishment Rulings
RULING:
CASE:
Woodson v. North Carolina (1976)
Mandatory death sentences for first-degree murder
violate the 8th and 14th Amendments (Due Process
Approach).
Coker v. Georgia (1977)
The 8th Amendment prohibits the implementation
of the death penalty for rape of an adult when the
victim is not killed (Eighth Amendment Approach).
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Lockett v. Ohio (1978)

Enmund v. Florida (1982)

Spaziano v. Florida (1984)

Ford v. Wainwright (1986)

Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988)

Felker v. Turpin (1996)

Buchanan v. Angelone (1997)

Panetti v. Quarterman (2007)

Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008)

1

Held that states may not limit the mitigating factors
juries consider in imposing the death sentence; must
allow for individualized sentencing (Due Process
Approach).
Held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the
imposition of capital punishment on those who aid
and abet, but do not commit, a felony in which
murder is also committed (Due Process Approach).
The Court held that Florida’s law allowing a judge
to override the jury’s death recommendation of life
in prison did not constitute double jeopardy, and did
not violate the constitutional requirement of
reliability in capital sentencing (Due Process
Approach).
The Court held that the execution of the insane was
unconstitutional (Eighth Amendment Approachrestrict capital punishment).
The Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty
on offenders who were under the age of 16 when
their crimes were committed (Due Process
Approach)
A unanimous Court upheld the provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
19961 (Due Process Approach-strengthening of due
process).
The Eighth Amendment does not require that a
capital jury be instructed on the concept of
mitigating evidence generally, or on particular
statutory mitigating factors (Eighth Amendment
Approach).
The Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental
illness deprives him of "the mental capacity to
understand that [he] is being executed as a
punishment for a crime" (Due Process Approach).
The Court struck down as unconstitutional a
Louisiana statute that allowed the death penalty for
the rape of a child where the victim did not die.
"Based both on consensus and our own independent

The law limits state prisoners’ filings second or successive applications for writes of habeas
corpus if no new claim is presented. The act also creates a “gate-keeping” mechanism in
requiring a three-judge panel to review an inmate’s second or successive habeas applications and
authorizes their denial without the possibility of further appeal.
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judgment, our holding is that a death sentence for
one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did
not intend to assist another in killing the child, is
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."

Source: O’Brien, David M. Constitutional Law and Politics. Vol. 2 7 ed. Pages 1222-1225
Appendix H
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Death Penalty Fact Sheet (The Death Penalty Information Center)
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Source: Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-states
supreme-court-decisions-1972-1996
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Appendix I
Capital Punishment on Trial: Table Executions (1930-1967)

Source: Oshinsky, David M. Capital Punishment on Trial: Furman v. Georgia and the Death
Penalty in Modern America. University Press of Kansas 2010.
Appendix J
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table- Capital Punishment by State, 2007
Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables
Table 1. Capital offenses by State, 2007
State
Offense
Alabama

Intentional murder with 18 aggravating factors (Ala. Stat. Ann.
13A-5-40(a)(1)-(18)).
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Arizona
Arkansas

California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland

Mississippi
Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

First-degree murder accompanied by at least 1 of 14 Aggravating
factors (A.R.S. § 13-703(F)).
Capital murder (Ark. Code Ann. 5-10-101) with a finding of at
least 1 of 10 aggravating circumstances; treason.
Revision: Amended the definition of capital murder to include
murder committed in the course of robbery, aggravated robbery,
residential burglary, or commercial burglary (Ark. Cod Ann. § 510-101 (Supp. 2007)), effective 7/31/2007.
First-degree murder with special circumstances; train wrecking;
treason; perjury causing execution.
First-degree murder with at least 1 of 17 aggravating factors;
first-degree kidnapping resulting in death; treason.
Capital felony with 8 forms of aggravated homicide (C.G.S. §
53a-54b).
First-degree murder with at least 1 statutory aggravating
circumstance (11 Del. C. § 4209).
First-degree murder; felony murder; capital drug trafficking;
capital sexual battery.
Murder; kidnapping with bodily injury or ransom when the victim
dies; aircraft hijacking; treason.
First-degree murder with aggravating factors; aggravated
kidnapping; perjury resulting in death.
First-degree murder with 1 of 21 aggravating circumstances.
Murder with 16 aggravating circumstances (IC 35-50-2-9).
Capital murder with 8 aggravating circumstances (KSA 21-3439,
KSA 21-4625).
Murder with aggravating factors; kidnapping with aggravating
factors (KRS 32.025).
First-degree murder; aggravated rape of victim under age 13
treason (La. R.S. 14:30, 14:42, and 14:113).
First-degree murder, either premeditated or during the commission
of a felony, provided that certain death eligibility requirements are
satisfied.
Capital murder (Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)); aircraft piracy
(Miss. Code Ann. § 97-25-55(1)).
First-degree murder (565.020 RSMO 2000). Revision: Added to
the capital statute provisions for selecting members of the
execution team and prohibiting disclosure of the identity of anyone
who has been on the execution team (Mo. Rev. Stat § 546.720),
Effective 8/28/2007.
Capital murder with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances (Mont. Code
Ann. § 46-18-303); aggravated sexual intercourse without consent
(Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503).
First-degree murder with a finding of at least 1 statutorily defined
aggravating circumstance.
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Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma

Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Virginia

First-degree murder with at least 1 of 15 aggravating
circumstances (NRS 200.030, 200.033, 200.035).
Six categories of capital murder (RSA 630:1, RSA 630:5).
First-degree murder with at least 1 of 7 statutorily-defined
aggravating circumstances (Section 30-2-1 A, NMSA).
First-degree murder with 1 of 13 aggravating factors (NY Penal
Law §125.27).
First-degree murder (NCGS §14-17).
Aggravated murder with at least 1 of 10 aggravating circumstances
(O.R.C. secs. 2903.01, 2929.02, and 2929.04).
First-degree murder in conjunction with a finding of at least 1 of 8
statutorily-defined aggravating circumstances; sex crimes against a
child under 14 years of age.
Aggravated murder (ORS 163.095).
First-degree murder with 18 aggravating circumstances.
Murder with 1 of 12 aggravating circumstances (§ 16-3-20(C)
(a)); criminal sexual conduct with a minor with 1 of 9 aggravators
(§ 16-3-655).Revision: Added as an aggravating circumstance
murder committed while in the commission of first-degree arson
(§16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(j)), effective 6/18/2007.
First-degree murder with 1 of 10 aggravating circumstances.
Revision: Amended the code of criminal procedure to allow for
use of a 3-drug protocol in administering lethal injection(SDCL §
23A-27A-32), effective 7/1/2007.
First-degree murder with 1 of 15 aggravating circumstances
(Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204).Revision: Amended the definition
of first-degree murder to include killing in the perpetration of rape
or aggravated rape of a child (Tenn Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2)),
effective 7/1/2007.
Criminal homicide with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances (Tex.
Penal Code § 19.03); super aggravated sexual assault (Tex. Penal
Code § 12.42(c)(3)). Revision: Revised the penal code and the
code of criminal procedure to allow the death penalty for
aggravated sexual assault of victims under the age of 14 when the
offender has a previous conviction for a similar offense (TX Penal
Code § 12.42(c)(3) and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 37.072),
effective 9/1/2007.
Aggravated murder (76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated). Revision:
Amended the criminal code to allow for an automatic sentence of
life without parole if the death penalty is ruled unconstitutional
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207) and added to the definition of
aggravated murder intentional killing
First-degree murder with 1 of 15 aggravating circumstances
(VA Code § 18.2-31).Revision: Added to the definition of capital
murder willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a judge or a
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Washington
Wyoming

witness when the killing is for the purpose of interfering with the
person's duties in a criminal case (Va. Code § 18.2-31(14) and
(15)), effective 7/1/2007.
Aggravated first-degree murder.
First-degree murder. Revision: Added as a capital offense murder
during the commission of sexual abuse of a minor (W.S. § 6-2101), effective 7/1/2007.

Note: New Jersey enacted legislation repealing the death penalty (P.L. 2007,
c.204 (NJSA 2C:11-3)), effective 12/17/2007.
Nine states revised statutory provisions relating to the death penalty during 2007.
The Colorado Supreme Court struck a portion of that state’s capital statute on
April 23, 2007 (People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007)). The statute
(Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(a)) specified that defendants pleading guilty
to a class 1 felony be sentenced by the judge, thereby requiring defendants to
waive their right to a jury trial on all facts essential to determining death penalty
eligibility as established in Ring v. Arizona. The court ruled that this was
unconstitutional under Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8).
See also Methodology.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf
Appendix K
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Method of Execution by State, 2007
Table 2. Method of execution, by State, 2007
Electrocution
Lethal gas
Lethal Injection
Alabamaa
Alabamaa
Arizonaa,b
Arizonaa,b
Arkansasa,d
Californiaa
Arkansasa,d
Floridaa
Missouria
a
California
llinoisa,h
Wyomingi

Hanging
Delaware a,c
New Hampshirea,e
Washingtona

Firing Squad
Idahoa
Oklahomaf
Utahg
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Colorado
Connecticut
Delawarea,c
Floridaa
Georgia
Idahoa
Illinoisa
Indiana
Kansas
Kentuckya,j
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouria
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshirea
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahomaa
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolinaa
South Dakota
Tennesseea,k
Texas
Utaha
Virginiaa
Washingtona
Wyominga

Kentuckya,j
Nebraska
Oklahomaf
South Carolinaa
Tennesseea,k
Virginiaa

Note: The method of execution of Federal prisoners is lethal injection, pursuant to 28
CFR, Part 26. For offenses under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, the execution method is that of the State in which the conviction took place (18 U.
S.C. 3596).
a
Authorizes two methods of execution.
b
Authorizes lethal injection for persons sentenced after November 15, 1992; inmates
sentenced before that date may select lethal injection or gas.
c
Authorizes lethal injection for those whose capital offense occurred on or after June 13,
1986; those who committed the offense before that date may select lethal injection or
hanging.
d
Authorizes lethal injection for those whose offense occurred on or after July 4, 1983;
inmates whose offense occurred before that date may select lethal injection or
electrocution.
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e

Authorizes hanging only if lethal injection cannot be given.
Authorizes electrocution if lethal injection is held to be unconstitutional, and firing squad
if both lethal injection and electrocution are held to be unconstitutional.
g
Authorizes firing squad if lethal injection is held unconstitutional. Inmates who selected
execution by firing squad prior to May 3, 2004, may still be entitled to execution by that
method.
h
Authorizes electrocution only if lethal injection is held illegal or unconstitutional.
I
Authorizes lethal gas if lethal injection is held to be unconstitutional.
j
Authorizes lethal injection for persons sentenced on or after March 31, 1998; inmates
sentenced before that date may select lethal injection or electrocution.
k
Authorizes lethal injection for those whose capital offense occurred after December 31,
1998; those who committed the offense before that date may select electrocution by
written waiver.
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8).
See also Methodology.

f

Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf
Appendix L
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Federal Capital Offenses, 2007
Capital Punishment, 2007- Statistical Tables
Table 3. Federal capital offenses, 2007
Statute
8 U.S.C. 1342

Description
Murder related to the smuggling of aliens.
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18 U.S.C. 32-34
18 U.S.C. 36
18 U.S.C. 37
18 U.S.C. 115(b)(3)
[by cross-reference to 18
U.S.C. 1111]

Destruction of aircraft, motor vehicles, or related facilities
resulting in death.
Murder committed during a drug-related drive-by shooting.
Murder committed at an airport serving international civil aviation.

Retaliatory murder of a member of the immediate family of law
enforcement officials.
18 U.S.
C. 241, 242, 245, 247
Civil rights offenses resulting in death.
18 U.S.C. 351
[by cross-reference to 18
U.S.C. 1111]

18 U.S.C. 794
18 U.S.C. 844(d), (f), (i)

18 U.S.C. 924(i)
18 U.S.C. 930
18 U.S.C. 1091
18 U.S.C. 1111
18 U.S.C. 1114
18 U.S.C. 1116
18 U.S.C. 1118
18 U.S.C. 1119
18 U.S.C. 1120
18 U.S.C. 1121

18 U.S.C. 1201
18 U.S.C. 1203
18 U.S.C. 1503
18 U.S.C. 1512
18 U.S.C. 1513
18 U.S.C. 1716
18 U.S.C. 1751
[by cross-reference to 18
U.S.C. 1111]

Murder of a member of Congress, an important executive official,
or a Supreme Court Justice.
Espionage.
Death resulting from offenses involving transportation of
explosives, destruction of government property, or destruction of
property related to foreign or interstate commerce.
Murder committed by the use of a firearm during a crime of
violence or a drug-trafficking crime.
Murder committed in a Federal Government facility.
Genocide.
First-degree murder.
Murder of a Federal judge or law enforcement official.
Murder of a foreign official.
Murder by a Federal prisoner.
Murder of a U.S. national in a foreign country.
Murder by an escaped Federal prisoner already sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Murder of a State or local law enforcement official or other person
aiding in a Federal investigation; murder of a State correctional
officer.
Murder during a kidnapping.
Murder during a hostage taking.
Murder of a court officer or juror.
Murder with the intent of preventing testimony by a witness,
victim, or informant.
Retaliatory murder of a witness, victim, or informant.
Mailing of injurious articles with intent to kill or resulting in death.
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18 U.S.C. 1958
18 U.S.C. 1959
18 U.S.C. 1992
18 U.S.C. 2113
18 U.S.C. 2119
18 U.S.C. 2245
18 U.S.C. 2251
18 U.S.C. 2280
18 U.S.C. 2281
18 U.S.C. 2332
18 U.S.C. 2332a
18 U.S.C. 2340
18 U.S.C. 2381
21 U.S.C. 848(e)
49 U.S.C. 1472-1473

Assassination or kidnapping resulting in the death of the President
or Vice President.
Murder for hire.
Murder involved in a racketeering offense.
Willful wrecking of a train resulting in death.
Bank-robbery-related murder or kidnapping.
Murder related to a carjacking.
Murder related to rape or child molestation.
Murder related to sexual exploitation of children.
Murder committed during an offense against maritime navigation.
Murder committed during an offense against a maritime fixed
platform.
Terrorist murder of a U.S. national in another country.
Murder by the use of a weapon of mass destruction.
Murder involving torture.
Treason.
Murder related to a continuing criminal enterprise or related
murder of a Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer.
Death resulting from aircraft hijacking.

Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8).
See also Methodology.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf

Appendix M
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Demographic characteristics of prisoners

Prisoners under sentence of death, 2007
Characteristic
Total inmates

Yearend
3,220

Admissions
115 1

Removals
28

98.3%
1.7

98.3%
1.7

99.2%
0.8

Gender
Male
Female
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Race
White
56.0%
Black
41.8
All other races* 2.2 0.9 3.1

58.3%
40.9

53.9%
43.0

14.4%
85.6
1

9.5%
90.5
12

Education
8th grade or less
13.8%
9th-11th grade
36.7
High school graduate/GED 40.4
Any college
9.2
Median
11th
Number unknown
522

7.9%
36.5
44.4
11.1
12th
52

13.9%
43.5
36.1
6.5
11th
20

Marital status
Married
Divorced/separated
Widowed
Never married
Number unknown

29.9%
14.9
2.3
52.9
28

20.4%
16.8
5.3
57.5
15

Hispanic origin
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
Number unknown

12.9%
87.1
413

22.2%
20.4
2.8
54.5
362

Note: Calculations are based on those cases for which data were reported. Detail may not add to
total due to rounding.
*At yearend 2006, inmates of "other" races consisted of 28 American Indians, 35 Asians, and 11
self identified Hispanics. During 2007, 1 Asian was admitted; and 2 American Indians, 1 Asian,
and 1 self identified Hispanic were removed.
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8). See also Methodology.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf
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Appendix N
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Number of persons executed by jurisdiction 1930-2007
Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables
Table 9. Number of persons executed, by jurisdiction, 1930-2007
Number executed
Jurisdiction
U.S. total
Texas
Georgia
New York

Since 1930

Since 1977

4,958

1,099

702
406
329

405
40
0
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North Carolina
306
43
California
305
13
Florida
234
64
South Carolina
199
37
Ohio
198
26
Virginia
190
98
Alabama
173
38
Mississippi
162
8
Louisiana
160
27
Pennsylvania
155
3
Oklahoma
146
86
Arkansas
145
27
Missouri
128
66
Kentucky
105
2
Illinois
102
12
Tennessee
97
4
New Jersey
74
0
Maryland
73
5
Arizona
61
23
Indiana
60
19
Washington
51
4
Colorado
48
1
Nevada
41
12
District of Columbia
40
0
West Virginia
40
0
Federal system
36
3
Massachusetts
27
0
Delaware
26
14
Connecticut
22
1
Oregon
21
2
Utah
19
6
Iowa
18
0
Kansas
15
0
Montana
9
3
New Mexico
9
1
Wyoming
8
1
Nebraska
7
3
Vermont
4
0
Idaho
4
1
South Dakota
2
1
New Hampshire
1
0
Note: Military authorities carried out an additional 160 executions between 1930 and 1961.
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8).
See also Methodology.
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Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf
Appendix O
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Age at time of arrest for capital offense
Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables
Table 7. Age at time of arrest for capital offense and age of prisoners under sentence of
death at yearend 2007
Prisoners under sentence of death

Age
Total number under sentence
of death on 12/31/07
19 or younger
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44

At time of arrest
Number*
Percent

On December 31, 2007
Number
Percent

2,955

100 %

3,220

100 %

317
812
677
508
321
172

10.7
27.5
22.9
17.2
10.9
5.8

1
42
249
431
574
546

-1.3
7.7
13.4
17.8
17.0
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45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65 or older
Mean age
Median age

88
34
19
5
2
29 yrs.
27 yrs.

3.0
1.2
0.6
0.2
0.1

583
357
250
127
60
43 yrs.
42 yrs.

18.1
11.1
7.8
3.9
1.9

-- Less than .05%
Note: The youngest person under sentence of death was a black male in Texas, born in June 1988
and sentenced to death in June 2007. The oldest person under sentence of death was a white male
in Arizona, born in September 1915 and sentenced to death in June 1983.
*Excludes 265 inmates for whom the date of arrest for capital offense was not available.
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8). See also Methodology.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf
Appendix P
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Number of persons executed by race, Hispanic origin, and
method

Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables
Table 16. Number of persons executed by race, Hispanic origin, and method, 1977-2007
Number of persons executed
Method of execution
Total
Lethal injection
Electrocution
Lethal gas
Hanging
Firing squad

White*

Black*

Hispanic

American
Indian*

631

373

81

8

6

536
82
8
3
2

301
69
3
0
0

79
2
0
0
0

7
1
0
0
0

6

*Excludes persons of Hispanic origin.
Source: National Prisoner Statistics. See also Methodology

Asian*

0
0
0
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Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf
Appendix Q
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Number of Persons Executed 1977-2007
Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables
Table 15. Number of persons executed, 1977-2007
Year

Number executed

1977
1979
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

1
2
1
2
5
21
18
18
25
11
16
23
14
31
38
31
56
45
74
68
98
85
66
71
65
59
60
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2006
2007

53
42

Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8).
See also Methodology
Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf
Appendix R
Information about Justices Who Authored Important Majority Opinions
Justice Stewart Potter: Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
Associate Justice
State Appointed From: Ohio
Appointed by President Eisenhower
Judicial Oath Taken: October 14, 1958
Date Service Terminated: July 3, 1981

State Appointed From:
Appointed by President
Judicial Oath Taken:
Date Service

Justice John Paul

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr: McClesky v. Kempp (1987)
Associate Justice
Virginia
Nixon
January 7, 1972
Terminated: June 26, 1987

Stevens: Atkins v. Virginia (2002)
Associate Justice
State Appointed From: Illinois
Appointed by President Ford
Judicial Oath Taken: December 19, 1975
Date Service Terminated: June 29, 2010
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy: Roper
v. Simmons (2005)
Associate Justice
State Appointed From: California
Appointed by President Reagan
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Judicial Oath Taken: February 18, 1988
Current

Chief Justice John J. Roberts Jr: Baze v. Rees (2008)
Chief Justice
State Appointed From: Maryland
Appointed by President Bush, G. W.
Judicial Oath Taken: September 29, 2005
Current

Source: U.S. Supreme Court. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx

Appendix S
Information about Justices Who Authored Major Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger: Furman v. Georgia (1972)
Chief Justice
State Appointed From: Virginia
Appointed by President Nixon
Judicial Oath Taken: June 23, 1969
Date Service Terminated: September 26, 1986

Justice Thurgood Marshall:
Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
Associate Justice
State Appointed From: New York
Appointed by President Johnson, L.
Judicial Oath Taken: October 2,
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1967
Date Service Terminated: October 1, 1991

Justice Harry A. Blackmun: McClesky v. Kempp (1987)
Associate Justice
State Appointed From: Minnesota
Appointed by President Nixon
Judicial Oath Taken: June 9, 1970
Date Service Terminated: August 3, 1994
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist: Atkins v. Virginia (2002)
Chief Justice
State Appointed From: Virginia
Appointed by President Reagan
Judicial Oath Taken: September 26, 1986
Date Service Terminated: September 3, 2005
Associate Justice (Elevated)
State Appointed From: Virginia
Appointed by President Nixon
Judicial Oath Taken: January 7, 1972
Date Service Terminated: September 26, 1986

Associate Justice
Appointed by President
Judicial Oath Taken:
Current

Justice Sandra Day

Justice Antonin Scalia: Atkins v. Virginia (2002)
State Appointed From: Virginia
Reagan
September 26, 1986

O’Connor: Roper v. Simmons
(2005)
Associate Justice
State Appointed From: Arizona
Appointed by President Reagan
Judicial Oath Taken: September 25, 1981
Date Service Terminated: January 31, 2006
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Baze v. Rees (2008)
Associate Justice
State Appointed From: New York
Appointed by President Clinton
Judicial Oath Taken: August 10, 1993
Current

Source: U.S. Supreme Court. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx

Appendix T
Number of Executions by State Since 1976
Population divided by # executed, 2010 Census figures

Texas
Virginia
Oklahoma
Florida
Missouri
Georgia
Alabama
N. Carolina
S. Carolina
Ohio
Louisiana

Total 2010

2009

Ratio*

464
108
93
69
67
48
49
43
42
41
28

24
3
3
2
1
3
6
0
2
5
0

1/1,000,000
1/2,600,000
1/1,000,000
1/9,000,000
1/6,000,000
1/3,000,000
1/780,000

17
3
2
1
0
2
5
0
0
8
1

1/2,000,000
1/2,000,000

Illinois
Nevada
Utah
Tennessee
Maryland
Washington
Nebraska
Pennsylvania
Kentucky
Montana
Oregon

Total 2010

2009

12
12
7
6
5
5
3
3
3
3
2

0
0
0
2 1/3,000,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

Ratio
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Arkansas
Arizona
Indiana
Delaware
California
Mississippi

27
24
20
14
13
13

0
1
0
0
0
3

0
0
1
0
0
0

1/6,000,000

Connecticut
Idaho
New Mexico
Colorado
Wyoming
South Dakota
US Gov’t

1
1
1
1
1
1
3

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

*Ratios are approximate, calculated using 2009 execution figures
Source: Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-statessupreme-court-decisions-1972-1996
2010 Census. State Population and the Distribution of Electoral Votes and Representatives.
http://www.thegreenpapers.com/Census10/HouseAndElectors.phtml

Appendix U
Chart: Global Death Penalty Use in 2009

The death penalty in 2009
More than two-thirds of the countries of the world have abolished the death penalty in law or in
practice. While 58 countries retained the death penalty in 2009, most did not use it. Eighteen
countries were known to have carried out executions, killing a total of at least 714 people;
however, this figure does not include the thousands of executions that were likely to have taken
place in China, which again refused to divulge figures on its use of the death penalty.
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Methods of execution in 2009 included hanging, shooting, beheading, stoning, electrocution and
lethal injection.
Death sentences and executions 2009
Where "+" is indicated after a country and it is preceded by a number, it means that the figure
Amnesty International has calculated is a minimum figure. Where "+" is indicated after a country
and is not preceded by a number, it indicates that there were executions or death sentences (at
least more than one) in that country but it was not possible to calculate a figure.
Source: Amnesty International. The Death Penalty in 2009. http://www.amnesty.org/en/deathpenalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2009
Appendix V
Death Penalty Public Opinion Polls
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, page 146
Table 2.53
Attitudes toward the death penalty for murder for selected groups
United States, 2002
Question: “Do you favor the death penalty for…?”
Favor
Oppose
Don't know/refused
Women
Juveniles
The mentally retarded
The mentally ill

68%
26
13
19

29%
69
82
75

3%
5
5
6

Note: These data are based on telephone interviews with a randomly selected national
sample of 1,012 adults, 18 years of age and older, conducted May 6-9, 2002. For a discussion of
public opinion survey sampling procedures, see Appendix 5.
Source: The Gallup Organization, Inc., The Gallup Poll [Online]. Available:
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr020520.asp [May 23, 2002]. Reprinted by permission.

Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t200372010.pdf
Table 2.0037.2010
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Attitudes toward the death penalty for persons convicted of murder
By politics and religious affiliation, United States, 2010a
Question: "Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose the death penalty for
persons convicted of murder?"
Favor

Oppose

Don't know/refused

Total

62%

30%

9%

Politics
Republican
Democrat
Independent

78
50
62

16
42
30

7
7
8

Religion
Protestant
White evangelical
White mainline
Black Protestant
Catholic
White Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Unaffiliated

65
74
71
37
60
68
43
61

26
19
21
49
32
26
45
32

9
7
8
14
8
6
13
6

Note: These data are based on telephone interviews with a randomly selected national sample
of 3,003 adults, 18 years of age and older, conducted July 21-Aug. 5, 2010. For a discussion
of public opinion survey sampling procedures, see Appendix 5.
a

Percents may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Forum on Religion & Public
Life. Few Say Religion Shapes Immigration, Environment Views: Religion and the Issues
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Sept. 17, 2010), pp. 15, 25. Table
adapted by SOURCEBOOK staff. Reprinted by permission.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics.
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost_2.html#2_ab
Appendix W
Pro-Death Penalty Organizations
Citizens Against Homicide
A non-profit, public benefits organization serving families and friends of homicide victims
Clark County Indiana Prosecuting Attorney
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Steven D. Stewart, Prosecuting Attorney for Clark County, Indiana, has established this web site
with information on Indiana's death penalty and an extensive listing of death penalty-related web
sites.
Justice For All
A Texas-based not-for-profit advocating for criminal justice reform with an emphasis on victim
rights. Justice for All is a strong advocate of the death penalty, and has established a separate
site, Prodeathpenalty.com, dedicated to pro-death penalty information and resources. It has also
established Murdervictims.com for survivors of victims of homicide.
Pro-Death Penalty.com
A resource for pro-death penalty information and resources. Includes case info on upcoming
executions, a collection of death penalty links, and current news.

Source: University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center. Death Penalty Organizations & Sites,
Pro & Con. http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/death/procon.html

Appendix X
Anti-Death Penalty Organizations
ACLU Death Penalty Campaign
The American Civil Liberties Union considers the death penalty to be unconstitutional under the
Eight Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and that its discriminatory application violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.
American Bar Association Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project
The Project will work toward achieving a national moratorium on executions until the death
penalty process is reformed (Filed an amicus curiae* brief in Roper v. Simmons).
Amnesty International Website Against the Death Penalty
Amnesty International is a well-known international human rights organization based in London,
with chapters throughout the world. It has an ongoing worldwide anti-death penalty campaign
and issues reports on the death penalty in a number of countries, including the U.S.
Campaign to End the Death Penalty
A national grassroots organization dedicated to the abolition of capital punishment.
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Citizens United for Alternatives to the Death Penalty (CUADP)
An organization promoting viable alternatives to the death penalty and heightened visibility for
those who seek better public policy in response to violent crime.
Coalition for Juvenile Justice
A representative national nonprofit organization: to give voice to state-identified concerns and
needs in juvenile justice; to advise state and federal policy makers and the federal Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; and to generate ongoing collegial support and
information exchange (Also filed an amicus curiae brief in Roper v. Simmons)
Death Watch International
Organization based in the UK exploring the issue of the death penalty on a global scale. Their
comprehensive website contains stories, news and factual information on the status of the death
penalty around the world.

The Innocence Project
A national litigation and public policy organization dedicated to exonerating wrongfully
convicted people through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent
further injustice.
The Moratorium Campaign
Works towards obtaining a moratorium on the death penalty, educating the public, and collects
signatures for a petition that will be delivered to the United States representatives to the United
Nations on Human Rights Day.
Murder Victims Families for Reconciliation
Abolitionist organization comprising relatives of homicide victims. "MVFR knows that - in spite
of that pain - vengeance is not the answer. The taking of another life by state killing only
continues the cycle of violence."
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty
A nationwide coalition of nearly 150 national, state, and local organizations working toward the
abolition of capital punishment.
Physicians for Human Rights
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Physicians for Human Rights mobilizes health professionals to advance health, dignity and
justice, and promotes the right to health for all.
Students Against the Death Penalty
A student-run organization that mobilizes youth through education and advocacy.
World Coalition Against the Death Penalty
The World Coalition Against the Death Penalty brings together all those committed to the
universal abolition of capital punishment. Aims to strengthen the international dimension of the
struggle against capital punishment.
Unitarian Universalists for Alternatives to the Death Penalty
A social action group seeking an end to the death penalty

*Or “friend of the court” brief. Filed in the Supreme Court by parties not directly involved in a
particular case but that has an interest in the issue before the Court.

Source: University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center. Death Penalty Organizations & Sites,
Pro & Con. http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/death/procon.html
Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-statessupreme-court-decisions-1972-1996
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Appendix Y
Executions Prior to 1972 by State
State608-1976
Virginia
New York
Pennsylvania
Georgia
North Carolina
Texas
California
Alabama
South Carolina
Louisiana
Arkansas
Ohio
Kentucky
New Jersey
Mississippi
Illinois
Massachusetts
Tennessee
Florida
Maryland
Missouri
West Virginia
Oklahoma
Indiana
Connecticut
Oregon
Washington, DC
Washington
Arizona
Colorado
New Mexico
Montana
Minnesota
Delaware
Nevada
Kansas
Rhode Island
Hawaii
Iowa

Executions 1608-1976
1,227
1,130
1,040
950
784
755
709
708
641
632
478
438
424
361
351
348
345
335
314
309
285
155
132
131
126
122
118
105
104
101
73
71
66
62
61
57
52
49
45
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Utah
Nebraska
Idaho
Vermont
New Hampshire
Wyoming
Maine
South Dakota
Michigan
Alaska
North Dakota
Wisconsin

43
34
26
26
24
22
21
15
13
12
8
1

Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-statessupreme-court-decisions-1972-1996
Appendix Z
Executions Prior to 1972 by Year
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Source: Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-us-16082002-espy-file

Appendix AA
Executions Prior to 1972 by Race

Race

Espy File 1608 - 1972

DPIC 1976 - 2007*

White

41% (5,902)

57% (621)

Black

49% (7,084)

34% (367)
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Native American

2% (353)

1% (15)

Hispanic

2% (295)

7% (75)

Other (includes Asian Pacific Islander and unknown)

6% (855)

1%(9)

14,489

1087

Total Executions

Source: Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-us-16082002-espy-file

Appendix BB
Founders’ Thoughts on Capital Punishment
Thomas Jefferson: “Punishments I know are necessary, and I would provide them strict and
inflexible, but proportioned to the crime. Death might be inflicted for murder and perhaps for
treason, [but I] would take out of the description of treason all crimes which are not such in
their nature. Rape, buggery, etc., punish by castration. All other crimes by working on high
roads, rivers, gallies, etc., a certain time proportioned to the offence. . . . Laws thus
proportionate and mild should never be dispensed with. Let mercy be the character of the
lawgiver, but let the judge be a mere machine. The mercies of the law will be dispensed equally
and impartially to every description of men; those of the judge or of the executive power will be
the eccentric impulses of whimsical, capricious designing man.”
Alexander Hamilton: was opposed capital punishment as “extreme severity”
James Madison: “I should not regret a fair and full trial of the entire abolition of capital
punishment.”
Benjamin Franklin: “That it is better [one hundred] guilty persons should escape than that one
innocent person should suffer.”

Source: Koellhoffer, Tara. Thomas Jefferson. Current Events, In His Own Words, If He
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Blogged… 3 Jan 2007.
http://thomasjefferson.worldhistoryblogs.com/2007/01/03/on-the-punishmentfitting-the-crime/
Andrews, F. The writings of George Washington: being his correspondence, addresses,
messages, and other papers, official and private, Volume 5. 1837.
http://books.google.com/books?id=c8EKAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA13&lpg=PA13&dq
=George+washington+and+capital+punishment&source=bl&ots=9xQNUDUsV&sig=Mc9kzpvMlv3oNhhNDK0F4wypDyg&hl=en&ei=EE3xTNmX
GKTvnQfthdybCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CCcQ6
AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false
http://socyberty.com/law/the-death-penalty-2/#ixzz16d8j9nb5
http://books.google.com/books?id=ip0eaOoVWWIC&pg=PA263&lpg=PA263&dq=Alexander+
Hamilton+on+capital+punishment&source=bl&ots=gPlGSfZ1H&sig=SyR31nEAy3FosqSWZgR1QNZcikU&hl=en&ei=z0L1TMUmwq3wBpzAqfE
G&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Alexan
der%20Hamilton%20on%20capital%20punishment&f=false
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Appendix CC
Reports on Cruelty of Certain Execution Methods
Excerpt from Human Rights Watch Report, So Long as They Die: Lethal Injections in the United
States (April 24, 2006).
Although supporters of lethal injection believe
the prisoner dies painlessly, there is mounting
evidence that prisoners may have experienced
excruciating pain during their executions. This
should not be surprising given that corrections
agencies have not taken the steps necessary to
ensure a painless execution. They use a sequence
of drugs and a method of administration that were
created with minimal expertise and little
deliberation three decades ago, and that were then
adopted unquestioningly by state officials with no
medical or scientific background. Little has
changed since then. As a result, prisoners in the
United States are executed by means that the
American Veterinary Medical Association regards
as too cruel to use on dogs and cats. (Part IV,
footnotes omitted).
Human rights law is predicated on recognition of
the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable
rights of all people, including even those who have committed terrible crimes. It prohibits torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. Human Rights Watch believes these rights
cannot be reconciled with the death penalty, a form of punishment unique in its cruelty and
finality, and a punishment inevitably and universally plagued with arbitrariness, prejudice, and
error. Thus our first recommendation is that states and the federal government abolish the death
penalty. If governments do not choose to abolish capital punishment, they must still heed human
rights principles by ensuring their execution methods are chosen and administered to minimize
the risk a condemned prisoner will experience pain and suffering. As state lethal injection
protocols have never been subjected to serious medical and scientific scrutiny, Human Rights
Watch recommends that each state suspends its lethal injection executions until it has convened a
panel of anesthesiologists, pharmacologists, doctors, corrections officials, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges to determine whether or not its lethal injection executions as currently
practiced are indeed the most humane form of execution. (Recommendations).
Source: Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1711
THE DEATH PENALTY V. HUMAN RIGHTS
Why Abolish the Death Penalty? (1)
September 2007
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Amnesty International

The time has come to abolish the death penalty worldwide. The case for abolition becomes more
compelling with each passing year. Everywhere experience shows that executions brutalize those
involved in the process. Nowhere has it been shown that the death penalty has any special power
to reduce crime or political violence. In country after country, it is used disproportionately
against the poor or against racial or ethnic minorities. It is also used as a tool of political
repression. It is imposed and inflicted arbitrary. It is an irrevocable punishment, resulting
inevitably in the execution of people innocent of any crime. It is a violation of fundamental
human rights.
Over the past decade an average of at least three countries a year have abolished the death
penalty, affirming respect for human life and dignity.(2) Yet too many governments still believe
that they can solve urgent social or political problems by executing a few or even hundreds of
their prisoners. Too many citizens in too many countries are still unaware that the death penalty
offers society not further protection but further brutalization. Abolition is gaining ground, but not
fast enough.
The death penalty, carried out in the name of the nation's entire population, involves everyone.
Everyone should be aware of what the death penalty is, how it is used, how it affects them, how
it violates fundamental rights.
The death penalty is the premeditated and cold-blooded killing of a human being by the state.
The state can exercise no greater power over a person than that of deliberately depriving him or
her of life. At the heart of the case for abolition, therefore, is the question of whether the state has
the right to do so.
When the world's nations came together six decades ago to found the United Nations (UN), few
reminders were needed of what could happen when a state believed that there was no limit to
what it might do to a human being. The staggering extent of state brutality and terror during
World War II and the consequences for people throughout the world were still unfolding in
December 1948, when the UN General Assembly adopted without dissent the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
The Universal Declaration is a pledge among nations to promote fundamental rights as the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace. The rights it proclaims are inherent in every human
being. They are not privileges that may be granted by governments for good behaviour and they
may not be withdrawn for bad behaviour. Fundamental human rights limit what a state may do to
a man, woman or child.
No matter what reason a government gives for executing prisoners and what method of execution
is used, the death penalty cannot be separated from the issue of human rights. The movement for
abolition cannot be separated from the movement for human rights.
The Universal Declaration recognizes each person's right to life and categorically states further
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that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment". In Amnesty International's view the death penalty violates these rights.
Self-defence may be held to justify, in some cases, the taking of life by state officials: for
example, when a country is locked in warfare (international or civil) or when law-enforcement
officials must act immediately to save their own lives or those of others. Even in such situations
the use of lethal force is surrounded by internationally accepted legal safeguards to inhibit abuse.
This use of force is aimed at countering the immediate damage resulting from force used by
others.
The death penalty, however, is not an act of self-defence against an immediate threat to life. It is
the premeditated killing of a prisoner who could be dealt with equally well by less harsh means.
There can never be a justification for torture or for cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment. The cruelty of the death penalty is evident. Like torture, an execution constitutes an
extreme physical and mental assault on a person already rendered helpless by government
authorities.
If hanging a woman by her arms until she experiences excruciating pain is rightly condemned as
torture, how does one describe hanging her by the neck until she is dead? If administering 100
volts of electricity to the most sensitive parts of a man's body evokes disgust, what is the
appropriate reaction to the administration of 2,000 volts to his body in order to kill him? If a
pistol held to the head or a chemical substance injected to cause protracted suffering are clearly
instruments of torture, how should they be identified when used to kill by shooting or lethal
injection? Does the use of legal process in these cruelties make their inhumanity justifiable?
The physical pain caused by the action of killing a human being cannot be quantified. Nor can
the psychological suffering caused by fore-knowledge of death at the hands of the state. Whether
a death sentence is carried out six minutes after a summary trial, six weeks after a mass trial or
16 years after lengthy legal proceedings, the person executed is subjected to uniquely cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.
Internationally agreed laws and standards stipulate that the death penalty can only be used after a
fair judicial process. When a state convicts prisoners without affording them a fair trial, it denies
the right to due process and equality before the law. The irrevocable punishment of death
removes not only the victim's right to seek redress for wrongful conviction, but also the judicial
system's capacity to correct its errors.
Like killings which take place outside the law, the death penalty denies the value of human life.
By violating the right to life, it removes the foundation for realization of all rights enshrined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
As the Human Rights Committee set up under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights has recognized, "The right to life...is the supreme right from which no derogation is
permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation..." In a general
comment on Article 6 of the Covenant issued in 1982, the Committee concluded that "all
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measures of abolition [of the death penalty] should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of
the right to life within the meaning of Article 40".
Many governments have recognized that the death penalty cannot be reconciled with respect for
human rights. The UN has declared itself in favour abolition. Two-thirds of the countries in the
world have now abolished the death penalty in law or practice.
Amnesty International's latest information shows that(3):
· 90 countries and territories have abolished the death penalty for all crimes;
· 11 countries have abolished the death penalty for all but exceptional crimes such as wartime
crimes;
· 30 countries can be considered abolitionist in practice: they retain the death penalty in law but
have not carried out any executions for the past 10 years or more and are believed to have a
policy or established practice of not carrying out executions,
· a total of 131 countries have abolished the death penalty in law or practice,
· 66 other countries and territories retain and use the death penalty, but the number of countries
which actually execute prisoners in any one year is much smaller.
Amnesty International' statistics also show a significant overall decline in the number of reported
executions in 2006. In 2006, 91% of all known executions took place in a small number of
countries: China, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan and the USA. Europe is almost a death penalty-freezone -- the main exception being Belarus; in Africa only six states carried out executions in
2006; in the Americas only the USA has carried out executions since 2003.
Unlike torture, "disappearances" and extrajudicial executions, most judicial executions are not
carried out in secret or denied by government authorities. Executions are often announced in
advance. In some countries they are carried out in public or before a group of invited observers.
No government publicly admits to torture or other grave violations of human rights, although
privately some officials may seek to justify such abuses in the name of the "greater good". But
retentionist governments, those that keep the death penalty, for the most part openly admit to
using it: they do not so much deny its cruelty as attempt to justify its use; and the arguments they
use publicly to justify the death penalty resemble those that are used in private to justify other,
secret abuses.
The most common justification offered is that, terrible as it is, the death penalty is necessary: it
may be necessary only temporarily, but, it is argued, only the death penalty can meet a particular
need of society. And whatever that need may be it is claimed to be so great that it justifies the
cruel punishment of death.
The particular needs claimed to be served by the death penalty differ from time to time and from
society to society. In some countries the penalty is considered legitimate as a means of
preventing or punishing the crime of murder. Elsewhere it may be deemed indispensable to stop
drug-trafficking, acts of political terror, economic corruption or adultery. In yet other countries,
it is used to eliminate those seen as posing a political threat to the authorities.
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Once one state uses the death penalty for any reason, it becomes easier for other states to use it
with an appearance of legitimacy for whatever reasons they may choose. If the death penalty can
be justified for one offence, justifications that accord with the prevailing view of a society or its
rulers will be found for it to be used for other offences. Whatever purpose is cited, the idea that a
government can justify a punishment as cruel as death conflicts with the very concept of human
rights. The significance of human rights is precisely that some means may never be used to
protect society because their use violates the very values which make society worth protecting.
When this essential distinction between appropriate and inappropriate mean is set aside in the
name of some "greater good", all rights are vulnerable and all individuals are threatened.
The death penalty, as a violation of fundamental human rights, would be wrong even if it could
be shown that it uniquely met a vital social need. What makes the use of the death penalty even
more indefensible and the case for its abolition even more compelling is that it has never been
shown to have any special power to meet any genuine social need.
Countless men and women have been executed for the stated purpose of preventing crime,
especially the crime of murder. Yet Amnesty International has failed to find convincing evidence
that the death penalty has any unique capacity to deter others from commuting particular crimes.
A survey of research findings on the relation between the death penalty and homicide rates,
conducted for the UN in 1988 and updated in 2002, concluded: ". . .it is not prudent to accept the
hypothesis that capital punishment deters murder to a marginally greater extent than does the
threat and application of the supposedly lesser punishment of life imprisonment."(4)
Undeniably the death penalty, by permanently "incapacitating" a prisoner, prevents that person
from repeating the crime. But there is no way to be sure that the prisoner would indeed have
repeated the crime if allowed to live, nor is there any need to violate the prisoner's right to life for
the purpose of incapacitation: dangerous offenders can be kept safely away from the public
without resorting to execution, as shown by the experience of many abolitionist countries.
Nor is there evidence that the threat of the death penalty will prevent politically motivated crimes
or acts of terror. If anything, the possibility of political martyrdom through execution may
encourage people to commit such crimes.
Every society seeks protection from crimes. Far from being a solution, the death penalty gives
the erroneous impression that "firm measures" are being taken against crime. It diverts attention
from the more complex measures which are really needed. In the words of the South African
Constitution Court in 1995, "We would be deluding ourselves if we were to believe that the
execution of...a comparatively few people each year...will provide the solution to the
unacceptably high rate of crime...The greatest deterrent to crime is the likelihood that offenders
will be apprehended, convicted and punished".
When the arguments of deterrence and incapacitation fall away, one is left with a more deepseated justification for the death penalty: that of just retribution for the particular crime
committed. According to this argument, certain people deserve to be killed as repayment for the
evil done: there are crimes so offensive that killing the offender is the only just response.
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It is an emotionally powerful argument. It is also one which, if valid, would invalidate the basis
for human rights. If a person who commits a terrible act can "deserve" the cruelty of death, why
cannot others, for similar reasons, "deserve" to be tortured or imprisoned without trial or simply
shot on sight? Central to fundamental human rights is that they are inalienable. They may not be
taken away even if a person has committed the most atrocious of crimes. Human rights apply to
the worst of us as well as to the best of us, which is why they protect all of us.
What the argument for retribution boils down to, is often no more than a desire for vengeance
masked as a principle of justice. The desire for vengeance can be understood and acknowledged
but the exercise of vengeance must be resisted. The history of the endeavour to establish the rule
of law is a history of the progressive restriction of personal vengeance in public policy and legal
codes.
If today's penal systems do not sanction the burning of an arsonist's home, the rape of the rapist
or the torture of the torturer, it is not because they tolerate the crimes. Instead, it is because
societies understand that they must be built on a different set of values from those they condemn.
An execution cannot be used to condemn killing; it is killing. Such an act by the state is the
mirror image of the criminal's willingness to use physical violence against a victim.
Related to the argument that some people "deserve" to die is the proposition that the state is
capable of determining exactly who they are. Whatever one's view of the retribution argument
may be, the practice of the death penalty reveals that no criminal justice system is, or
conceivably could be, capable of deciding fairly, consistently and infallibly who should live and
who should die.
All criminal justice systems are vulnerable to discrimination and error. Expediency, discretionary
decisions and prevailing public opinion may influence the proceedings at every stage from the
initial arrest to the last-minute decision clemency. The reality of the death penalty is that what
determines who shall be executed and who shall be spared is often not only the nature of the
crimes but also the ethnic and social background, the financial means or the political opinions of
the defendant. The death penalty is used disproportionately against the poor, the powerless, the
marginalised or those whom repressive governments deem it expedient to eliminate.
Human uncertainty and arbitrary judgments are factors which affect all judicial decisions. But
only one decision -- the decision to execute -- results in something that cannot be remedied or
undone. Whether executions take place within hours of a summary trial or after years of
protracted legal proceedings, states will continue to execute people who are later found to be
innocent. Those executed cannot be compensated for loss of life and the whole society must
share responsibility for what has been done.
It is the irrevocable nature of the death penalty, the fact that the prisoner is eliminated forever,
that makes the penalty so tempting to some states as a tool of repression. Thousands have been
put to death under one government only to be recognized as innocent victims when another set of
authorities comes to power. Only abolition can ensure that such political abuse of the death
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penalty will never occur.
When used to crush political dissent, the death penalty is abhorrent. When invoked as a way to
protect society from crime, it is illusory. Wherever used, it brutalizes those involved in the
process and conveys to the public a sense that killing a defenseless prisoner is somehow
acceptable. It may be used to try to bolster the authority of the state -- or of those who govern in
its name. But any such authority it confers is spurious. The penalty is a symbol of terror and, to
that extent, a confession of weakness. It is always a violation of the most fundamental human
rights.
Each society and its citizens have the choice to decide about the sort of world people want and
will work to achieve: a world in which the state is permitted to kill as a legal punishment or a
world based on respect for human life and human rights -- a world without executions.
Recommendations:
Amnesty International calls on the UN General Assembly, 62nd session, (2007) to adopt a
resolution:
· Affirming the right to life and stating that abolition of the death penalty is essential for the
protection of human rights;
· Calling on retentionist states to establish a moratorium on executions as a first step towards
abolition of the death penalty;
· Calling on retentionist states to respect international standards that guarantee the protection of
the rights of those facing the death penalty; and
· Requesting the UN Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the moratorium to the
next session of the UNGA.

Source: Amnesty International.
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGACT510022007&lang=e

Appendix DD
Pro-Death Penalty Article
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Death Decisions
By Michael Nevin (04/08/04)

In 1965 Robert Lee Massie killed Mildred Weiss in San Gabriel, California while robbing her
and her husband. He received the death penalty. However, in 1972 all the death sentences in
California were commuted to life, so in 1978 Massie was paroled. On January 3, 1979 Robert
Massie shot and killed San Francisco liquor store owner Boris Naumoff and wounded a store
clerk during yet another robbery.[1]
On February 6, 2001 San Francisco District Attorney Terrence Hallinan addressed a San
Francisco court refusing to file a motion to set the execution date for Robert Lee Massie.
Hallinan told the court, The death penalty does not constitute any more deterrent than life
without parole.[2] Hallinan, a longtime and outspoken opponent of the death penalty, let his
personal feelings outweigh his duty as a district attorney to carry out state law. The California
State Attorney General’s office was forced to step in and set the date of execution. Although it
was too late for one San Francisco liquor store owner, Massie faced the ultimate deterrent as fate
would eventually catch up with him.
Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, who commuted the death sentences of all 167 Illinois
inmates in 2002, addressed the California Legislature last year saying, I don’t know what’s
wrong with calling a delay for a couple years.[3] Ryan, who is under federal indictment for
taking payoffs while Illinois Secretary of State, was nominated for the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize
for his efforts to stop the death penalty.[4] He joined illustrious company that includes California
death row inmate and L.A. Crips street gang co-founder Stanley Tookie Williams. Williams, a
convicted killer of four, was nominated twice for the same peace award.[5] I would suspect
Mumia Abu-Jamal, honorary citizen of Paris and executioner of Philadelphia police officer
Daniel Faulkner, would lend his support for Ryan’s nomination.
Ryan called for a moratorium in California where only 10 people have been put to death since
1977, although the state has sentenced 795 people to death between 1976 and 2002. Imperial
County District Attorney Gilbert Otero stated, The state’s citizens can take solace in the
extraordinary safeguards used to ensure that only those murderers who are most deserving
receive the death penalty. There is no need whatsoever to impose a so-called moratorium in
California. California limits the death penalty to first-degree murder with special circumstances,
train wrecking, treason, or perjury causing execution. A Cornell University study released in
March 2004 found that California has a death sentence rate of only 1.3% while the national
average stood at 2.2%.[6]
Several myths about the death penalty have been reported but continue to be debunked upon
closer examination. The Liebman study at Columbia University, Broken System: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1995,released its results in 2000 claiming serious flaws in the system,
including a high rate. It was later revealed that the misleading included any issue requiring
further review by a lower court, even when the court upheld the sentence. The 23-year study
found no cases of mistaken executions.[7] The numerous appeals in capital cases demonstrate the
extraordinary adherence to due process. The fallacy that innocent people are being executed
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cannot be validated, and it is intellectually dishonest for opponents of the death penalty to
perpetrate this myth. The death penalty in America is undoubtedly one of the most accurately
administered criminal justice procedures in the world.
The issue of race has been cited by critics, who complain that minorities are unfairly chosen for
death sentences. According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, since the death penalty was
reinstated by the Supreme Court in 1976, white inmates have made up more than half of those
under sentence of death. In 2002, 71 persons in 13 states were executed: 53 were white and 18
were black. The Cornell University study found that African Americans represented 41.3% of
condemned inmates while they committed 51.5% of homicides.[8]
Upon closer examination, an issue can be made of the small number of executions compared to
the number of people under sentence of death. According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics,
at yearend 2002, 37 states and the federal prison system held 3,557 prisoners under sentence of
death (all for committing murder), but only 71 were executed. In 1954 147 prisoners were under
sentence of death, and 81 were executed. Many condemned inmates today are more likely to die
of old age than lethal injection. Of the 6,912 people under sentence of death between 1977 and
2002 only 12% were executed.[9] A 2003 Clemson University study by Professor Joanna
Shepherd concluded: If criminals prefer lengthy death row waits to short ones, as their numerous
appeals and requests for stays suggest, then shortening the time until execution could increase
the death penalty’s deterrent impact I find that shorter waits on death row increase deterrence.
Specifically, one extra murder is deterred for every 2.75-years reduction in the death row wait
before each execution.[10] People behave economically by weighing cost and benefit. Incentive
is a human behavior that cannot be overlooked when it comes to deterrence. The death penalty
saves innocent lives when it is properly administered, making it a worthy punishment.
States that have the death penalty must provide extraordinary safeguards to ensure guilt. Once
guilt has been established and appeals are exhausted, justice should be swift. The families of the
victims deserve nothing less. The Pro-Death Penalty.com website offers a startling statistic: The
518 killers who were executed between 1998 and 2003 had murdered at least 1111 people. That
is an average of 2.14 victims per executed killer. The people on death row made disastrous
decisions while members of society. The next decision these killers should make is choosing
menu items for a final meal.
**Author's Note: This revised article originally posted on this site May 8, 2003.
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